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PLEASE REMAIN STANDING: USING FED. R. CIV. P. 15(D) 
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING TO CURE DEFECTS IN STANDING 
Carson E. Miller* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, civil filings in U.S. federal district courts grew six percent, up 
to 292,076 filings in total.1 The growth in the federal caseload is not 
surprising; the total number of pending civil cases grew to 349,666.2 This 
growth reinforces the courts’ never-ending mandate “to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”3 
This mandate sprouts from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. 
Civ. P.” or the “Federal Rules”), which apply comprehensive, uniform 
procedural rules “to encourage courts to reach the merits of a case rather 
than dismissing it solely on minor procedural technicalities.”4 
With this in mind, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit joined 
the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits in Scahill v. District 
of Columbia, holding that plaintiffs may cure standing defects through a 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) supplemental pleading that shows standing from 
events after the original complaint was filed and dismissed for lack of 
standing.5 This holding reinforced a split in the federal circuit courts of 
appeals, as the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have required 
plaintiffs to establish standing at the time of original filing, and otherwise 
refile a new complaint should they want to include events that support 
standing subsequent to the initial complaint.6 
This Article argues that the circuit split should be resolved in line with 
the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Scahill, as the original standing 
requirement “harkens back to the type of technical obstacle” the Supreme 
Court and the Federal Rules have repeatedly rejected.7 In Part II, this 
Article will discuss the history and use of the “curable defects exception” 
 
* Associate Member, University of Cincinnati Law Review. I sincerely appreciate each friend and 
colleague for their thoughtful comments and constructive criticism on this Note, particularly Kevin Cox 
and Edward Rivin. I would also like to thank Professor Michael Solimine for his invaluable insights and 
research suggestions. 
 1. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2017, U.S. COURTS (April 9, 2019), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2017 
[https://perma.cc/F85E-BAWP]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 4. Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, Individual Judges’ Practices: An Inadvertent 
Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 4 (1994). 
 5. Scahill v. District of Columbia, 909 F.3d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 6. See, e.g., Park v. Forest Service of U.S., 205 F.3d 1034, 1040 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 7. Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1184. 
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to res judicata and collateral estoppel/issue preclusion to resolve 
insufficient pleading. Part II will also discuss Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) and 
the standing doctrine. Part II will review the circuit split and the major 
cases on each side. Finally, Part III will argue that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) 
supplemental pleadings best allow federal courts to efficiently and 
accurately resolve standing defects that can be cured by subsequent 
events—in keeping with the overarching intent of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  
II. BACKGROUND 
The curable defects exception to issue preclusion concerns the 
interaction of several issues. This section will discuss (1) issue preclusion 
generally, and the general use of the curable defects exception; (2) Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 15(d) and the wide discretion granted to courts therein to allow 
supplemental pleadings; and (3) the concept of standing in civil litigation. 
This section will next outline the two general ways in which federal 
circuit courts have resolved this issue at hand. First, this section will 
discuss what this Article calls the “permissive approach” adopted by the 
D.C. Circuit in Scahill v. District of Columbia,8 and followed by the First, 
Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits. Second, this section will 
discuss what this Article calls the “original-standing approach,” currently 
followed by the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. Because of its 
presence throughout the cases discussed, this section will begin with a 
discussion of issue preclusion, supplemental pleading, and standing. 
A.   Issue Preclusion and “Curable Defects” 
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, generally refers to a prior 
judgement’s effect of preventing the relitigating of issues that have 
already been litigated in a previous action, regardless of whether it was 
based on the same cause of action in the second lawsuit.9 In other words, 
the doctrine operates to prevent relitigation of an issue between the same 
parties (or parties in privity to the original parties) in any future lawsuit 
based on a different claim.10 Generally, courts require the following 
 
 8. Id. at 1177. 
 9. See, e.g., B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 140 (2015) (“Sometimes 
two different tribunals are asked to decide the same issue. When that happens, the decision of the first 
tribunal usually must be followed by the second, at least if the issue is really the same. Allowing the same 
issue to be decided more than once wastes litigants' resources and adjudicators' time, and it encourages 
parties who lose before one tribunal to shop around for another. The doctrine of collateral estoppel or 
issue preclusion is designed to prevent this from occurring.”). 
 10. See In re Azeglio, 422 B.R. 490, 494 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (applying collateral estoppel to “a 
party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding”). 
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elements be met to apply issue preclusion or collateral estoppel to a claim: 
(1) the issue originally decided was identical with the issue in the present 
action; (2) the prior adjudication resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits; (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel or issue preclusion 
is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; 
and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.11 
Issue preclusion is often, but not always, limited to factual findings 
rather than matters of law.12 This is not the case in all jurisdictions, 
however—according to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, an issue 
foreclosed on relitigation may be an evidentiary fact, the application of 
law to fact, or an issue of law applied to the parties in the prior 
proceeding.13 “Issue preclusion usually applies to dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction as well as for other grounds.”14 The judgment ordering 
dismissal will “have preclusive effect as to matters actually adjudicated; 
it will, for example, preclude relitigation of the precise issue of 
jurisdiction that led to the initial dismissal.”15  
However, many courts will not bar subsequent suits when the reason 
for initial dismissal is cured—as long as there has not been a final 
judgment on the merits and the underlying facts have sufficiently changed 
to allow for a second suit.16 For instance, a dismissal for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the claim on the merits, and 
the litigant may refile in the appropriate forum.17 Additionally, if the 
second-filed claim presents the same jurisdictional issue raised in the first 
suit, the suit is barred by issue preclusion unless the second-filed claim 
contains “new information which cures the jurisdictional defect fatal to 
the first-filed suit.”18 Essentially, this “curable defects doctrine” allows 
for relitigation of jurisdictional and other procedural dismissals when a 
“material occurrence subsequent to the original dismissal remedies the 
original deficiency.”19 
 
 11. See, e.g., LSREF2 Barron, LLC v. Alexander SRP Apartments, LLC, 17 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 
1310 (N.D. Ga. 2014). 
 12. See Eicher v. Mid America Fin. Inv. Corp., 702 N.W.2d 792, 809 (Neb. 2005) (finding that a 
determination by a federal bankruptcy court that a party lacked standing in a bankruptcy proceeding was 
not a judgment on the factual merits of the party’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim also party to the 
attempted bankruptcy proceeding). 
 13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW. INST. 2019). 
 14. Safadi v. Novak, 574 F. Supp. 2d 52, 55 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 
F.2d 1189, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
 15. GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 16. See Lea v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 203, 214 (Fed. Cl. 2016). 
 17. Id. at 213 (quoting Lowe v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 218, 228-29 (Fed. Cl. 2007)). 
 18. Id. (quoting Goad v. U.S., 46 Fed. Cl. 395, 398 (Fed. Cl. 2000)). 
 19. Scahill v. District of Columbia, 909 F.3d 1177, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citing Nat’l Ass’n of 
Home Builders v. EPA, 786 F.3d 34, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).  
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Dozier v. Ford Motor Co. provides a good illustration of the curable 
defect doctrine analysis.20 In Dozier, the plaintiff’s first complaint was 
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based in part on a 
complete lack of diversity and in part on the absence of the requisite 
amount in controversy.21 Plaintiff later refiled in the District Court for the 
District of Columbia, complaining of the same transaction but this time 
alleging a sufficient amount in controversy.22 The plaintiff argued that the 
inadequate damage claim in the first suit was merely a pleading 
deficiency, but the court disagreed: “it does not qualify [as a curable 
defect exception to issue preclusion].”23 The court reasoned that the 
exception applies when a “precondition requisite” to the court’s 
proceeding with the original suit was not alleged or proven, but is later 
provided in the second suit.24 The problem in the first suit is remedied by 
events that happened after the original dismissal.25 The court reasoned 
that although it is desirable to give the plaintiff multiple chances to plead 
these newly occurred facts, it is a separate matter to allow the plaintiff to 
arbitrarily change previously pleaded facts about events that occurred 
prior to the initial filing.26 Therefore, the court upheld the district court’s 
dismissal of the second claim as a valid use of the issue preclusion 
doctrine.27 
B.  Federal Rule 15(d) and Supplemental Pleading 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) provides: 
Supplemental Pleadings. On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, 
on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out 
any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the 
pleading to be supplemented. The court may permit supplementation even 
though the original pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense. The 
court may order that the opposing party plead to the supplemental pleading 
within a specified time.28 
The rule is intended “to give district courts broad discretion in allowing 
 
 20. See 702 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, Circuit Judge). 
 21. Id. at 1190 (“[T]he suit sought ‘$7,000 compensatory and $1,000,000 in punitive damages for 
alleged breach of express and implied warranties pertaining to an automobile manufactured by Ford.’”). 
 22. Id. (“alleging $16,400 in actual [damages]”) (the diversity jurisdiction minimum amount in 
controversy at the time was $10,000). 
 23. Id. at 1192. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. (“[e.g.] filing of affidavit, service of process or present residence”). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1195 (“We decline to prolong the contest in the federal courts by allowing the plaintiff 
simply to change his mind as to the damages he has suffered.”). 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d). 
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supplemental pleadings[,]” and promote judicial economy and 
convenience.29 Moreover, “[i]t is a useful device, enabling a court to 
award complete relief, or more nearly complete relief, in one action, and 
to avoid the cost, delay and waste of separate actions which must be 
separately tried and prosecuted.”30 A supplemental pleading differs from 
an amended pleading: although an amended pleading concerns matters 
that happened prior to the original pleading and serves to completely 
replace the original pleading, a supplemental pleading concerns events 
that happened after the initial pleading and adds to the initial pleading.31 
A supplemental pleading is an addition to, rather than a replacement of, 
the original complaint.32 Therefore, it is appropriate for parties to follow 
up their pleadings with supplemental pleadings should that be needed to 
bring a case up to date.33  
Supplemental pleadings are particularly flexible—even when parties 
have mislabeled requests for supplemental pleadings, courts have granted 
leave to file the correct type of pleading.34 Because the motions under the 
rule for amended pleading and supplemental pleading are both within the 
discretion of the court, the fact that parties may incorrectly plead one or 
the other is not fatal.35 Thus, courts may treat amended pleadings which 
seek to add claims to the original pleadings as if they had been properly 
filed pursuant to Rule 15(d), even if incorrectly labeled.36 
A supplemental pleading may be used for numerous purposes. 
Supplemental pleadings may be used to introduce facts which bring the 
original pleading up to date, including new facts which enlarge or change 
the relief first sought.37Additionally, supplemental pleadings may reflect 
events that occurred after the original pleading was first filed.38 Although 
some courts have held that supplemental pleadings cannot assert new 
causes of action, other courts have allowed such pleadings so long as the 
new pleading is based on the events and facts raised in the original 
pleading and does not unduly prejudice the opposing party.39 
 
 29. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of Int., 236 F.R.D. 491, 495-96 (E.D. 
Cal. 2006) (quoting Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 30. Id. at 496. 
 31. Habitat Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Kimbell, 250 F.R.D. 397, 401 (E.D. Wis. 2008). 
 32. Millay v. Surry Sch. Dept., 584 F. Supp. 2d 219, 226 (D. Maine 2008) (quoting United States 
v. Russell, 241 F.2d 879, 882 (1st Cir. 1957)). 
 33. See Francis ex rel. Estate of Francis v. Northumberland Cty., 636 F. Supp. 2d 368, 383 (M.D. 
Pa. 2009). 
 34. See, e.g., Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., No. 13104, 1970 WL 10113, *1 (D. Conn. 
Sept. 23, 1970). 
 35. Soler v. G & U, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 69, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Kaiser-Frazier Corp. v. Otis & Co., 8 F.R.D. 364, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
 38. See City of Texarkana, Tex. v. Arkansas, Louisiana Gas Co., 306 U.S. 188, 203 (1939). 
 39. See Health Ins. Ass’n of America v. Goddard Claussen Porter Novelli, 213 F.R.D. 63, 67 
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Under the 1963 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
courts have been given great discretion to allow for supplemental 
pleadings despite defective original pleadings.40 The court may allow 
supplemental pleading even though the original pleading is defective in 
stating a claim or defense.41 All of this is to say that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) 
allows for broad and flexible supplemental pleading, which permits 
litigants to correct mistakes without the added cost and expense of 
dismissal and subsequent suits over the same set of issues. 
C.  Standing 
Standing is the “legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject 
matter of the controversy that entitles a party to invoke the jurisdiction of 
the court.”42 Article III of the Constitution of the United States limits the 
jurisdiction of federal courts to cases and controversies, of which the 
“core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part[.]”43 
Standing is a prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction; a lack of standing 
bars consideration of a claim by the court.44 Standing focuses on the party 
seeking relief and its relationship to the claim seeking to be adjudicated.45 
In evaluating standing, courts look to the substantive issues of law not to 
evaluate them on the merits, but instead to determine “whether there is a 
logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim[.]”46 
Standing contains three elements.47 First, a plaintiff must “have 
suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest 
which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.”48 Second, there must be a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of: “the injury has to be 
‘fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... 
 
(D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Aftergood v. Central Intelligence Agency, 225 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30 (D.D.C. 2002)). 
 40. Notes of Advisory Committee on 1963 Amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d).  
 41. Harnett v. Barr, 538 F. Supp. 2d 511, 514 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 42. State v. Lamb, 789 N.W.2d 918, 926 (Neb. 2010) (citing Myers v. Neb. Invest. Council, 724 
N.W.2d 776 (2006)). 
 43. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see also U.S. Const. Art. III. 
 44. Frost Nat. Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. 2010) cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1180 
(2011). 
 45. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 525-26 (1975) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 
618 (1973)). 
 46. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1968) (“For example, standing requirements will vary in 
First Amendment religion cases depending upon whether the party raises an Establishment Clause claim 
or a claim under the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
 47. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 48. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 
1548 (2016) (finding that even an alleged statutory violation must still have a concrete injury to confer 
standing on the plaintiff).  
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th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the 
court.’”49 Finally, “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ 
that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”50 General 
injuries, such as the right to have the government act as the plaintiff would 
like under the law, are not sufficient to support standing.51 This 
constitutional, injury-in-fact requirement for standing helps to ensure that 
a plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.52 And, 
even when litigants have been permitted to assert the rights of others, the 
“litigants themselves still ‘must have suffered an injury in fact, thus 
giving [them] a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the issue 
in dispute.’”53 
To illustrate, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court held 
that wildlife advocacy organizations did not have standing to seek judicial 
review of new administrative rules promulgated by the Secretaries of the 
Interior and Commerce pursuant to the Endangered Species Act of 1973.54 
The rule at issue limited enforcement of some of the Endangered Species 
Act to actions within the United States or the high seas, rather than 
internationally.55 The advocacy groups filed suit, seeking declaratory 
judgment to reverse the new rules back to their prior, much broader 
jurisdictional scope, which would possibly restore funding for the 
advocacy groups’ overseas efforts to restore endangered species.56 The 
Court found the injury asserted—that the possible extinction of certain 
endangered species protected under the older rules—insufficient to give 
standing for federal judicial jurisdiction.57 Further, despite the lack of 
clarity with regard to any injury suffered, the Court could not follow the 
advocacy group’s reasoning as to how the litigation at hand could 
effectively provide relief for their alleged injury.58 The Court concluded 
 
 49. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 
(1976)). 
 50. Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43). 
 51. Seegers v. Gonzales, 396 F.3d 1248, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 754 (1984)). 
 52. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157-58 (2014) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)) (reasoning that standing prevents the “judicial process from being used to usurp 
the powers of the political branches”). 
 53. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 
(1991)). 
 54. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 559. 
 57. Id. at 566-67 (While it is possible to think of an individual who works with an endangered 
species to possibly perceive a harm, “[i]t goes beyond the limit, however, and into pure speculation and 
fantasy, to say that anyone who observes or works with an endangered species, anywhere in the world, is 
appreciably harmed by a single project affecting some portion of that species with which he has no more 
specific connection.”). 
 58. Id. at 570-71 (“The short of the matter is that redress of the only injury in fact respondents 
7
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by noting the that the standing requirement centers on the idea that the 
“party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.”59 
The standing doctrine is a rule of judicial self-restraint based on the 
principle that courts should not resolve abstract questions or issue 
advisory opinions; the judicial system must resolve the issues and injuries 
for the parties before it.60 Within this context, the ideas of standing and 
broad, supplemental pleadings sometimes come to a head—and the 
federal circuit courts are divided as to the proper resolution. 
D.  The Tenth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits: The Original Standing 
Approach 
In Park v. Forest Service of U.S., the Eighth Circuit declared that 
“standing is to be determined at the commencement of the suit[.]”61 
Relying on this “commencement of the suit” language from Lujan and 
other Supreme Court decisions, the Tenth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits 
have held that the standing analysis must only include what was pled at 
the moment the complaint was filed.62 Relying on the traditional role of 
standing to ensure that only those with a real, injury-in-fact may sue (and 
 
complain of requires action (termination of funding until consultation) by the individual funding agencies; 
and any relief the District Court could have provided in this suit against the Secretary was not likely to 
produce that action.”).  
 59. Id. at 578. As a practical matter, challenges to standing are usually brought as FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but this is not always the case. See 
Martin H. Redish & Sopan Joshi, Litigating Article III Standing: A Proposed Solution to the Serious (But 
Unrecognized) Separation of Powers Problem, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1376-77 (2014). Oddly enough, 
Lujan concerned a case dismissed for lack of standing on a FED. R. CIV. P. 56 motion for summary 
judgment, not a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. at 1374; see also Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 559. For a more in-depth discussion of the practical concerns of litigating standing beyond the 
scope of this Article, Redish and Joshi implore the federal district courts to resolve standing issues at the 
earliest possible opportunity so as to avoid exercising its jurisdiction against parties without actual cases 
or controversies before them—including through preliminary discovery to allow for a determination on 
the merits (and to only allow determinations of standing on FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss, 
separate from the actual merits of the case). See Redish & Joshi, supra note 59 at 1378. 
 60. See Law Project for Psych. Rights, Inc. v. State, 239 P.3d 1252 (Alaska 2010). 
 61. 205 F.3d 1034, 1038 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 570, n.5). Justice Scalia’s 
plurality opinion in Lujan featured several footnotes that criticized the dissenting opinions’ willingness to 
show the redressability of Plaintiff’s alleged injuries through eventual arrival at the Supreme Court. 
Footnote five provides:  
Seizing on the fortuity that the case has made its way to this Court, Justice Stevens protests that 
no agency would ignore “an authoritative construction of the [ESA] by this Court.” In that he is 
probably correct; in concluding from it that plaintiffs have demonstrated redressability, he is not. 
Since, as we have pointed out above, standing is to be determined as of the commencement of 
suit; since at that point it could certainly not be known that the suit would reach this Court; and 
since it is not likely that an agency would feel compelled to accede to the legal view of a district 
court expressed in a case to which it was not a party; redressability clearly did not exist. 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 570, n.5. 
 62. See Park, 205 F.3d at 1038-39. 
8
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to reduce instances of frivolous filings), “[i]t is not enough for [the 
plaintiff] to attempt to satisfy the requirements of standing as the case 
progresses.”63 This leads to a very simple analysis for these circuits when 
determining whether to allow supplemental pleadings to satisfy the 
standing requirement: they do not.64 In Park, Plaintiff was a member of a 
group known as the “Rainbow Family” that alleged various constitutional 
violations against the forest service in the operation of a checkpoint on 
Forest Service land.65 Plaintiff also alleged that the Forest Service would 
continue to use checkpoints against her group in the future.66 The Forest 
Service did not contest that the checkpoint was impermissibly used, but 
countered that Plaintiff had not shown that she would be subject to 
unconstitutional checkpoints in the future, and therefore did not have 
standing to seek injunctive relief.67 
Plaintiff, on appeal, filed affidavits stating that checkpoints had been 
used in subsequent years against her group, to show continuing and future 
injury-in-fact.68 The Eighth Circuit, however, disagreed as to the 
relevance of the subsequent evidence: 
We do not think, however, that the actual use of checkpoints in 1997, 1998, 
and 1999 is relevant on the issue of standing because all of these events 
occurred after [Plaintiff] filed her original complaint. We believe that it is 
[Plaintiff]’s burden to show that, at the time she filed her suit in 1996, there 
was a real and immediate threat that she would again be subjected by the 
Forest Service to an unconstitutional checkpoint. We do not think that she 
may use evidence of what happened after the commencement of the suit to 
make this showing.69 
After excluding evidence of subsequent checkpoints, the court held that 
there was insufficient probability that the Forest Service would violate 
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights in the future—thus, the threatened injury 
was not “certainly impending.”70  
The Seventh Circuit followed a similar line of reasoning in Pollack v. 
U.S. Dept. of Justice.71 In Pollack, Plaintiff lived near a U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps shooting range, which Plaintiff alleged led to the discharge 
of lead bullets into Lake Michigan.72 Plaintiff then alleged that the 
 
 63. Id. (quoting Perry v. Village of Arlington Heights, 186 F.3d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 1999)) (“The 
requirements of standing must be satisfied from the outset.”). 
 64. See id. at 1040. 
 65. Id. at 1036. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1037. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. at 1040. 
 71. 577 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 72. Id. at 738. 
9
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“deterioration of the lead bullets in the water harmed the environment, in 
violation of the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act, and state nuisance law.”73 The court 
found that Plaintiff lacked standing to allege injury from his enjoyment 
of an “immense tract of territory,”74 and refused to consider any injury 
alleged after the filing of the complaint specific to the shooting range at 
issue.75 
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit follows the original-filing rule, which 
holds that: “standing is determined at the time the action is brought … .”76 
In Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Palma, a wilderness advocacy 
group challenged the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) granting 
hydrocarbon leases, which would have allowed for tar-sands oil 
extraction on federal lands.77 Although the district court dismissed for 
lack of standing, the Tenth Circuit found the initial complaint to 
sufficiently state a particular injury to facially survive a standing 
challenge.78 However, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss 
because the claims were not ripe—the injury alleged would potentially be 
sufficient to survive a standing challenge, but “[t]here is simply too much 
uncertainty as to “when and what type of drilling, if any, will occur on the 
thirty-nine contested leases.”79 Regardless of the disposition of the case, 
the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its standing determination at the moment that 
the complaint is filed at the outset of the litigation.80 
In sum, the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits place great weight on 
analyzing standing at the moment that the complaint is filed. The analysis 
is simple, but well-supported—and, in some cases, even disposed of in a 
single footnote.81 Such an analysis sits in stark contrasts to the liberal 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 740 (quoting Lujan v. Nat. Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) (a separate case from 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 43, with a very similar fact pattern and result)). 
 75. Id. at 742 n.2 (“Although Pollack visited Foss Park after he commenced suit, a plaintiff must 
establish standing at the time suit is filed and cannot manufacture standing afterwards.”) (citing Friends 
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000)). 
 76. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Palma, 707 F.3d 1143, 1152-53 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Mink 
v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
 77. Id. at 1146-47. 
 78. Id. at 1156-57. 
 79. Id. at 1160-61. Understanding the distinction between ripeness and standing is not particularly 
necessary for purposes of this Article, but the Tenth Circuit largely rested on an assumption that, as 
alleged, the individual plaintiffs had sufficiently pled a tangible injury because of BLM’s alleged variation 
from its standard leasing practices, yet no actual injury had occurred at the outset of the litigation, and 
without imminent hardship or an injunction the case was not ripe. Id.  
 80. Id. at 1153 (“[A]lthough we examine the allegations in SUWA’s Amended Complaint, our 
inquiry focuses on whether SUWA had standing when the original complaint was filed in April 2007.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 81. See, e.g., Pollack v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 577 F.3d 737, 742 n.2 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A] plaintiff 
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supplementation allowed by other circuits—and adopted by the D.C. 
Circuit in Scahill. 
E.  First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits: The “Permissive 
Approach” 
In contrast, the “permissive approach” applies Federal Rule 15(d) to 
standing defects to allow plaintiffs to cure dismissals for lack of standing 
with evidence of events or facts that occurred subsequent to the original 
complaint.82 This approach is highly flexible and places a premium on 
judicial economy; instead of litigants being forced to refile their cases 
again, they can merely file a motion to reconsider the standing issue along 
with a Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) supplemented pleading to cure the standing 
defect in the initial pleading.83 The Second Circuit adopted this approach 
in Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Associates,84 in which it held that if a 
complaint, as supplemented, alleges sufficient facts to support the alleged 
injury, a plaintiff could establish standing despite earlier dismissal.85 
Other circuits have joined the Second Circuit’s approach over the last 
twenty-five years. 
The main distinction between the approaches centers on the permissive 
approach’s acceptance of supplemental pleadings as a stand-in for the 
“time a complaint is filed.”86 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Northstar 
Financial Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab Investments illustrates this subtle 
difference.87 In that case, an investment fund filed a class action against 
the trustees of a Massachusetts investment fund, alleging that the trustees 
deviated from the fund’s policies, thus exposing investors to millions of 
dollars in losses.88 The fund owned no shares on its own, and filed the 
initial suit without obtaining an assignment of claims from any fund 
investor.89 The district court initially dismissed the complaint for lack of 
standing, yet the fund filed a supplemented complaint—and survived a 
renewed motion to dismiss.90 The Ninth Circuit agreed: “[a] rule that 
 
must establish standing at the time suit is filed and cannot manufacture standing afterwards.”). 
 82. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(d) affords litigants a pathway for pleading any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened 
after the date of the pleading to be supplemented. The rule shares the core objective of the Civil Rules: to 
make pleadings a means to achieve an orderly and fair administration of justice.”). 
 83. See, e.g., Northstar Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 84. 973 F.2d 82, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 85. Id. at 88 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d)). 
 86. See Northstar, 779 F.3d at 1043. 
 87. See id. 
 88. Id. at 1042.  
 89. Id. at 1043. 
 90. Id. at 1043-44 (citing Northstar Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 781 F.Supp.2d 926, 932-
33 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that dismissing the complaint for lack of standing based on the initial filing 
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would turn on the label attached to a pleading is difficult for us to 
accept.”91 Preferring the flexibility and broad application of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Ninth Circuit held that concerns of “the 
misuse of the pleading for strategic gamesmanship” were not warranted 
in comparison to the benefits provided by supplemental pleading.92 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit focuses on the “facts existing at the time 
the complaint under consideration was filed” when determining 
jurisdictional matters like standing.93 In Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm 
Corp., the Federal Circuit noted that the addition of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) 
was critical to resolving the dispute; the rule grants district courts 
permission to allow plaintiffs to supplement a jurisdictionally defective 
original pleading—which the court applied to the standing doctrine.94   
And, in stark contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s dismissal of 
“manufactur[ed] standing” in Pollack,95 the Fourth Circuit expressly 
approves of such a practice. In Daniels v. Arcade, L.P., the Fourth Circuit 
rejected a defendant’s contention that the plaintiff lacked standing.96 The 
defendant argued that plaintiff had not alleged that the plaintiff had even 
been on the premises prior to filing the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”) complaint, and that plaintiff’s history of pursuing ADA 
litigation somehow demonstrated a lack of sincere injury.97 The court 
rejected this argument, finding that it was irrelevant whether plaintiff had 
been to the location at issue prior to filing the original complaint because 
the allegations in the supplemented complaint were at issue.98 The court 
further rejected defendant’s cited precedent from other circuits to hold 
that standing is a jurisdictional issue, to be determined on the basis of 
amended and supplemented pleadings.99 Essentially, where the Seventh 
Circuit took offense to a plaintiff manufacturing standing once standing 
 
would have “elevate[d] form over substance”)). 
 91. Id. at 1047. 
 92. Id. at 1048. 
 93. Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting GAF 
Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Elk Corp., 90 F.3d 479, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (emphasis in original). 
 94. Id. The court then found that plaintiff’s supplemented complaint still failed to sufficiently 
allege an injury in fact, and upheld dismissal for lack of standing. Id. at 1339-40. See also 6A Charles 
Allan Wright, Arthur Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1505 (2018) (“Rule 
15(d) now expressly approves curative supplemental pleadings and the rule is neither unconstitutional nor 
beyond the bounds of Congress' rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act.”). 
 95. See Pollack v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 577 F.3d 737, 742 n.2 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 96. Daniels v. Arcade, L.P., 477 F. App’x. 125, 130 (4th Cir. 2012).  
 97. Id. at 129-130. 
 98. Id. at 130 (“Although it is unclear whether Daniels' “regular[ ]” visits to the Market began 
before the date of the original complaint, March 3, 2010, or instead began merely before the date of the 
amended complaint, August 9, 2010, we conclude that the resolution of this question is not necessary to 
the result we reach. It is undisputed that Daniels visited the Market before he became a party to this lawsuit 
when the amended complaint was filed.”) (emphasis added). 
 99. Id. at 131. 
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was questioned, the Fourth found such a factor irrelevant to the standing 
determination. 
Continuing this trend, the First Circuit adopted the permissive 
approach on the basis of Rule 15’s intent to provide fairness and access 
to justice.100 In United States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., the 
defendant relied on a 2013 First Circuit decision that upheld a 
jurisdictional dismissal on the basis of facts alleged only in the original 
complaint.101 As applied to standing in a Rule 15(d) supplemental 
pleading, the First Circuit rejected defendant’s argument.102 The court 
noted that Rule 15(d)’s adoption in 1963 requires courts to consider more 
than just the narrow, traditional approach to this issue:  
[t]he new language was designed to ensure that the amended rule would 
give the court broad discretion in allowing a supplemental pleading so that 
plaintiffs would not be needlessly remitted to the difficulties of 
commencing a new action even though events occurring after the 
commencement of the original action have made clear the right to relief.103  
Additionally, the court looked to the Federal, Fourth, and Ninth 
Circuits that “have not hesitated to make this implication explicit.”104 The 
court thus held that the complaint was eligible for Rule 15(d) 
supplementation.105 
The Circuit Courts that have adopted the permissive approach have 
found supplemented pleading impliedly authorized in standing disputes 
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v. Diaz.106 In Mathews, 
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Rule 15(d) could be 
applied to supplement a complaint originally lacking in subject matter 
jurisdiction.107 The plaintiff in Matthews was a Medicare applicant who 
failed to file his Medicare application until after a complaint had been 
filed to join him in a proposed class action lawsuit (as a Medicare 
recipient).108 The Court held that the jurisdictional defect—that the 
plaintiff was not a Medicare recipient at the time of the original complaint 
and thus court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over his claim—
 
 100. U.S. ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 1, 4-5 (2015). 
 101. Id. at 4. Defendant cited U.S. ex rel. Estate of Cunningham v. Millennium Laboratories of Cal., 
Inc., 713 F.3d 662, 664 (1st Cir. 2013) (“Jurisdiction is determined based on whether it existed at the time 
the plaintiff filed the original complaint.”). 
 102. PharMerica, 809 F.3d at 4-5 (“After careful consideration, we find PharMerica’s position 
untenable.”). 
 103. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 104. Id. at 5 (the implication in this case was that the use of Rule 15(d) to cure jurisdictional defects 
also applies to standing). 
 105. Id. at 6. 
 106. 426 U.S. 67, 74-75 (1974). 
 107. Id. at 71-72. 
 108. Id. at 75. 
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could be cured through supplementation.109 Seeing little distinction 
between subject-matter jurisdiction and the standing requirement, many 
circuits felt authorized to “make this implication explicit.”110 
F.  The D.C. Circuit Adopts the Permissive Approach: Scahill v. District 
of Columbia 
The D.C. Circuit is the latest to adopt the permissive approach.111 In 
Scahill, the court had to determine whether the curable defects exception 
to issue preclusion, as applied to a dismissal for lack of standing, allows 
a plaintiff to establish standing based on events “that arose after the initial 
complaint was filed” through a Rule 15(d) supplemental pleading.112 
Plaintiffs were the owners of a restaurant in Washington, D.C. who lost 
their liquor license for serving alcohol to minors.113 As a result, they shut 
down the restaurant and reopened another restaurant in the same 
location.114 When they applied for a license for the new restaurant, the 
D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (“Board”) granted the license 
with several restrictions.115 These conditions required the restaurant to 
“maintain a barring notice against [one of the owners] to prohibit him 
from entering or accessing the licensed premises for a period of five 
years” and to notify the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) of any 
violations.116  
The owners attempted to have the license conditions set aside under 
D.C. law, but were rejected on the grounds that the Board acted within its 
discretion and the owners did not have standing because they did not have 
a tangible injury.117 Thereafter, the owners filed a complaint in federal 
court alleging that the conditions violated their First and Fifth 
Amendment rights.118 The district court dismissed the owners’ complaint 
on the grounds that they were precluded in view of the D.C. Court of 
Appeals’ determination that it did not have standing.119 The owners then 
 
 109. Id. (“A supplemental complaint in the District Court would have eliminated this jurisdictional 
issue; since the record discloses, both by affidavit and stipulation, that the jurisdictional condition was 
satisfied, it is not too late, even now, to supplement the complaint to allege this fact.”). 
 110. See, e.g., PharMerica, 809 F.3d at 6. 
 111. See Scahill v. District of Columbia, 909 F.3d 1177, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2018).  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 1179-80. 
 114. Id. at 1180. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 117. Id. (citing HRH Servs., LLC v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., No. 16-AA-758, Order 
at 1 (D.C. Oct. 13, 2016)). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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moved for reconsideration and leave to file an amended complaint—
which when filed, alleged that the owners had been issued a $4,000 fine 
for violating the license’s conditions.120 The district court denied the 
motion to reconsider by applying the standing analysis at the time of the 
original complaint.121 
On appeal, the owners contended that the district court erred in ruling 
that they lacked standing, and that the prior dismissal for lack of standing 
did not preclude an amended or supplemental complaint from establishing 
standing from events that occurred after the initial complaint.122 The D.C. 
Circuit agreed.123 The court first examined the curable defect exception 
to issue preclusion: “[t]he curable defect exception to issue preclusion 
allows relitigation of jurisdictional dismissals when a material occurrence 
subsequent to the original dismissal remedies the original deficiency.”124 
The court then looked to Matthews, finding that the Supreme Court’s use 
of Rule 15(d) to allow events subsequent the original complaint to help 
the plaintiff establish jurisdiction.125 The court further looked to the 
Ninth, First, Fourth, Federal, and Second Circuits, which “have held that 
a plaintiff may cure a standing defect through a supplemental pleading 
alleging facts that arose after the original complaint was filed.126 Finally, 
the court reasoned that dismissing a plaintiff’s complaint for lack of 
standing when subsequent events would establish standing “harkens back 
to the type of technical obstacle that . . . Rule 15(d) was designed to 
avoid.”127 Because the alternative “forces a plaintiff to go through 
unnecessary hassle and expense of filing a new lawsuit,” the court held 
that plaintiffs could establish standing through supplemental pleading of 
subsequent events.128  
III.  DISCUSSION 
Should the Supreme Court ever decide to consider the issue, the Court 
should adopt the permissive approach and allow standing defects at the 
outset of litigation to be cured by subsequent events through Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 15(d) supplemental pleadings. This section will discuss the reasons for 
resolving the circuit split in this manner: (1) the purpose of Rule 15(d), as 
 
 120. Id. at 1181. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 1184. 
 124. Id. at 1182 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 786 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). 
 125. Id. (citing Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 57, 75 (1976)). 
 126. Id. at 1183 (internal citations omitted).  
 127. Id. at 1184 (citing Rockwell Int. Corp. v. United States, 594 U.S. 457, 474 (2007)). 
 128. Id. Ironically, despite plaintiffs’ winning on the supplemental pleading of standing issue, the 
D.C. Circuit upheld dismissal on the merits. Id. at 1185-86. 
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amended in 1963, expressly calls for courts to have great deference and 
flexibility to resolve minor technical problems in pleadings; (2) standing 
is comparable to jurisdictional defects, which the Supreme Court has 
allowed to be cured through Rule 15(d); and (3) the practical benefits of 
allowing litigants to cure standing defects with Rule 15(d) substantially 
outweigh any practical consequences of a strict interpretation of the 
standing doctrine. This section will next evaluate the arguments put forth 
by the Tenth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits in support of the original 
standing approach, particularly in the context of the key cases discussed 
above.129 This section concludes that the text and practical application of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) to standing issues is best resolved through the 
permissive approach. 
A.  Allowing Standing Defects to be Cured Through Supplemental 
Pleadings is in Accordance with the Intent of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). 
The Advisory Committee notes to the 1963 amendment of Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 15(d) states that “Rule 15(d) is intended to give the court broad 
discretion in allowing a supplemental pleading.”130 At the time of the 
amendment, the Advisory Committee harshly criticized courts that 
refused to allow subsequent events to come in as a supplemental 
complaint, calling these courts’ views “rigid and formalistic.”131 The main 
concern at issue is that a plaintiff may be “needlessly remitted to the 
difficulties of commencing a new action even though events occurring 
after the commencement of the original action have made clear the right 
to relief.”132 And, even though the Rules grant judges discretion in making 
the final determination, there is no doubting the Rules’ endorsement of 
the practice.133 Rule 15(d)’s history supports this flexible and broad 
application of supplemental proceedings; the rule is an adaptation of 
former Federal Equity Rule 34, which allowed courts to permit 
supplemental pleadings when the litigant was ignorant of certain facts at 
the time of filing.134 Rule 15(d) adapted and expanded the old equity rule, 
providing for inclusion of “occurrences or events which have happened 
since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.”135  
 
 129. These cases, notably Park v. Forest Service of U.S., 205 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2000) and Pollack 
v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 577 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2009), dealt with the courts’ particular concerns with 
plaintiffs manufacturing standing in activist litigation contexts.  
 130. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d) (Advisory Committee Notes, 1963 Amendment). 
 131. Id. (citing, e.g., Bonner v. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 177 F.2d 703 (2nd Cir. 1949)). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Federal Telephone & Radio Corp. v. Associated. Tel. & Tel. Co., 88 F. Supp. 375, 376-77 (D. 
Del. 1949). 
 135. Id. 
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Indeed, the entire reason for Rule 15(d)’s 1963 amendment was to 
combat a formalistic approach; the Rule’s broad discretion led some 
courts to refuse to allow a complaint to be supplemented when the original 
complaint did not state a cause of action.136 By rejecting this approach 
through the 1963 amendments, the Advisory Committee gave greater 
force to the Federal Rules’ goal of speedy adjudication on the merits.137 
There is no reason, under Rule 15(d)’s text and early history, to not 
include standing as a defect curable under the Rule. The Rule’s scope is 
broad and flexible, and expanded upon the earlier equitable rules rather 
than merely importing them into modern practice. Further, the fact that 
the Rule was amended in 1963 to stop the formalistic prevention of 
supplemented complaints speaks to the issue as presently considered: 
standing should not be singled out as unable to be supplemented under 
Rule 15(d). 
B.  Standing is Comparable to Curable Jurisdictional Defects  
Since the 1963 Amendment, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that courts may look beyond the original complaint to determine 
jurisdiction.138 Though these cases have dealt with jurisdiction, standing 
is not dissimilar. In Mathews v. Diaz, the Court had “little difficulty” 
finding that the plaintiff met his jurisdictional requirements to bring suit, 
even if those requirements were met after the original complaint.139 
Indeed, a “supplemental complaint in the District Court would have 
eliminated this jurisdictional issue.”140 This interpretation is also 
consistent with the Court’s discussion of Rule 15(d) in Rockwell Int’l 
Corp. v. United States, a case in which the Court wrote that “when a 
plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the 
complaint, courts look to the amended complaint to determine 
jurisdiction.”141 
 
 136. 28 A.L.R. FED. 129 § 10 (West 2019). The middle sentence of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (“The 
court may permit supplementation even though the original pleading is defective in stating a claim or 
defense”) specifically addresses this issue so as to combat the overly formalistic interpretation offered 
after the rule’s initial introduction. Id. 
 137. See Technical Tape Corp. v. Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co., 200 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1952) (Clark, 
J., concurring) (“Defendants’ claim that one cannot amend a non-existent action is purely formal in light 
of the wide and flexible content given to the concept of action under the new rules.” (internal quotations 
omitted)). Judge Clark is considered “the principal architect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 
Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Zahn v. Int’l 
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 297 (1973)). 
 138. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S 67, 75 (1976); see also Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 
549 U.S. 457, 460 (2007). 
 139. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 75. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Rockwell, 549 U.S. at 473-74. 
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Although technically distinct from subject-matter jurisdiction, standing 
is litigated in a substantially similar manner.142 Even though Rule 15(d) 
is phrased “in terms of correcting a deficient statement of ‘claim’ or a 
‘defense,’ a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should be treated like any 
other defect for purposes of defining the proper scope of supplemental 
pleading.”143 The similarity does not end at the application of Rule 15(d); 
indeed, dismissing claims for lack of standing is procedurally identical to 
dismissing claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.144 When a 
defendant moves to dismiss for lack of standing, it is usually done through 
a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.145 That is not to say that subject-matter jurisdiction and 
standing are necessarily identical, but it is certainly worth noting the 
procedural similarity. In short, the Supreme Court and other federal courts 
have allowed Rule 15(d) supplemental pleadings to cure jurisdictional 
and other defects, and there is no reason to not apply that same reasoning 
to standing defects. 
C.  As a Policy Matter, Allowing Supplemental Pleading to Cure 
Standing Defects Substantially Outweighs Formalistic Concerns 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are intended to be used to secure 
the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every action.146 To those 
ends, Rule 15(d) “is a useful device, enabling a court to award complete 
relief, or more nearly complete relief, in one action, and avoid the cost, 
delay and waste of separate actions which must be separately tried and 
prosecuted.”147 Litigation is time consuming and expensive; litigants need 
efficient and fair resolutions for their disputes.148 This desire to control 
costs has influenced recent revisions of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Supreme Court pleading requirements.149 And, despite 
 
 142. See Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Redish & Joshi, supra note 59 at 1376. 
 145. Id. 
 146. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 147. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 28-29 (4th Cir. 1963) (“So useful they are 
and of such service in the efficient administration of justice that they ought to be allowed as of course, 
unless some particular reason for disallowing them appears, though the court has the unquestioned right 
to impose terms upon their allowance when fairness appears to require them.”). 
 148. Hon. William G. Young and Jordan M. Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a More Complete 
Model of Federal District Court Productivity, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 55, 97-98 (2013) (arguing that a 
judge’s presence in a courtroom may be a better indicator of litigant satisfaction than merely relying on 
the timeliness or efficiency of the resolution). 
 149. Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 857-58 (2015); see also Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (“proceeding to . . . discovery can be expensive.”); Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (discussing a plausibility standard for complaints not expressly 
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these reform efforts, the evidence of their effectiveness in controlling 
litigation cost is debatable.150 Some scholars even advocate that the 
Federal Rules should limit litigation budgets directly, rather than limit 
pleading and other standards to conform to a perceived need to increase 
judicial and litigation efficiency.151 At the very least, the rules have been 
reformed in an effort to improve the litigants’ experience within the 
courts.152 
Procedure, and what could be characterized as unnecessary procedure, 
keeps potential litigants out of the courts and leaves disputes unresolved; 
the Federal Rules seek to improve this stark reality by balancing the broad 
concepts of due process with overburdensome rulemaking.153 Indeed, the 
heightened pleading standard could be a different conclusion than the 
original Rule drafters intended and result in the dismissal of meritorious 
cases, “with only marginal gains in the speedy disposition of cases.”154 
What has resulted is a dissonance between a judicial movement to more 
quickly resolve the disputes in federal court and a broad mandate in Rule 
1 to reach a “just” conclusion.155  
Applying Rule 15(d) supplemental pleading to cure standing defects 
addresses all of these policy concerns. First, by resolving these issues 
through a supplemental pleading, the litigants are spared the significant 
time and expense it would take to refile. The court would not have to 
reevaluate the case from scratch; it would be able to examine the 
supplemented pleading with the subsequent factual material and 
determine whether the standing issue is adequately resolved. This would 
either unequivocally dispose of the litigation or more quickly resolve the 
dispute on the merits if warranted. Unlike a heightened pleading 
requirement or narrowing views of class actions (as the Rules were 
amended to do on these policy grounds), a broader application of Rule 
 
stated in the federal rules). 
 150. See Tidmarsh, supra note 149 at 858 (“As the frequent waves of reform suggest, the effort to 
date appears not to have been especially successful.”). 
 151. Id. at 858 (arguing that the rules could require parties to submit a litigation budget, and have 
the court determine and issue an order requiring budgetary adherence). 
 152. George Rutherglen, The Problem with Procedure: Some Inconvenient Truths About 
Aspirational Goals, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2019). Rutherglen begins by noting that Learned Hand 
once compared litigation to a certain kind of hell: “I must say that as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit 
beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death.” Id. (quoting Learned Hand, The Deficiencies 
of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS, 1921-1922, at 87, 105 (1926)). 
 153. Rutherlgen, supra note 152 at 3-4 (“[o]thers are screened out by the cost of litigation, 
consisting in no small part of the preliminary stages of procedure--pleading, discovery, and associated 
motions and objections . . . when efficiency is disaggregated into speed and expense, as they are in Rule 
1, tradeoffs between these two values are inevitable.”). 
 154. Id. at 27. 
 155. Id. at 28. Even if Twombly and Iqbal have yet to have a statistical effect on speed or efficiency 
of litigation, they can be read as a policy preference for the courts to reduce the amount of frivolous 
litigation. 
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15(d) has no “accuracy” tradeoff that could potentially reach a wrong 
result through a procedural shortcut built on the name of efficiency.156 
Through a simple motion for reconsideration or leave to supplement the 
complaint based on subsequent events, litigants can receive a more cost-
effective resolution of the dispute that is also speedier and less of a burden 
on the court system—while also more accurate.157 
D.  The Original Filing Approach insufficiently addresses the Federal 
Rules’ intent, and is best considered within the context of activist 
litigation. 
The Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit’s requirement that standing be 
established at the time of original filing stems from the fact that standing 
is beyond the federal courts’ discretion as an express requirement of 
Article III’s “cases and controversies” requirement.158 This is the major 
distinction between a court’s jurisdictional requirements and standing: 
jurisdiction may be based upon statute and can vary from case to case, but 
standing is a constitutional requirement for every single case in the federal 
courts.159 This may help to explain why the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuit’s analysis of a possible cure to initial standing defects has been so 
brief—without initial standing, the courts feel that they do not have 
constitutional authority to even consider plaintiffs’ motions for 
reconsideration or supplementation via Rule 15(d).160  
The trouble is, when plaintiffs seek to bring in subsequent events to 
supplement their original pleading, they are not asking the courts to 
adjudicate their dispute on the merits without standing. Rather, they are 
asking courts to reconsider a finding of no injury in fact when later events 
can help confirm that an injury actually occurred—events which can be 
resolved through adjudication of the originally filed suit. Courts are not 
 
 156. See Rutherglen, supra note 152 at 3-4 (discussing the competing mandates of Rule 1). 
 157. This argument is outlined by the Ninth and D.C. Circuits in Scahill and Northstar; the courts 
could not find a competing interest in the “original filing” rule that was not easily offset by Rule 15(d)’s 
practical benefits. See, e.g. Scahill v. District of Columbia, 909 F.3d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“The 
alternative approach forces a plaintiff to go through the unnecessary hassle and expense of filing a new 
lawsuit when events subsequent to filing the original complaint have fixed the jurisdictional problem. The 
‘reasonable notice’ and ‘just terms’ limitations in Rule 15(d) guard against undue expansion of a provision 
designed to eliminate ‘needless[ ] remitt[ing]’ of a plaintiff.”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d) (Advisory 
Committee notes to 1963 amendment)). 
 158. See Tyler R. Stradling and Doyle S. Byers, Note, Intervening in the Case (or Controversy): 
Article III Standing, Rule 24 Intervention, and the Conflict in the Federal Courts, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
419, 419 (2003) (“Federal courts ensure compliance with Article III in part by requiring the plaintiff 
bringing the lawsuit to possess standing.”).  
 159. See id. (standing’s application to and relationship with the Rules of Civil Procedure is 
“amorphous” and complex). 
 160. Supra Section II.D (discussing the brevity of analysis offered by the lead cases on this issue 
before the Seventh and Eighth Circuits). 
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being asked to consider facts that should have been plead in the first 
complaint; these facts are barred from coming in under the collateral 
estoppel/issue preclusion doctrine.161 This is merely an easy way to 
quickly reconsider the standing issue based on facts that would be plead 
should the plaintiff file a new suit anyway—without any of the 
procedural, efficiency, and effectiveness downsides of a new lawsuit.  
Perhaps the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits are best considered 
within their factual contexts as environmental-activist litigation. Since the 
1970s, federal judges have been wary of claims perceived as “frivolous,” 
and have used elevated requirements for individual plaintiffs requesting 
drastic remedies.162 Both Park and Pollack fit this description—
particularly in Pollack’s case where an individual claimed injury from 
exposure to all of Lake Michigan, then subsequently tried to establish 
standing by taking a swim in a location closer to the alleged pollution.163 
These kinds of remedies stand in stark contrast to those sought in cases 
considered by the permissive circuits.164 However, completely denying 
standing defects from being supplemented under Rule 15(d) is too severe 
a reaction for such a simple solution. Courts worried about a slippery 
slope of successive rounds of supplemental pleading can rest assured: 
“The ‘reasonable notice’ and ‘just terms’ limitations in Rule 15(d) guard 
against undue expansion of a provision designed to eliminate “needless[] 
remitt[ing]” of a plaintiff.”165 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Scahill, the D.C. Circuit joined the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and 
Federal Circuits recognizing the permissive approach: Plaintiffs may cure 
standing defects through a Rule 15(d) supplemental pleading to show 
standing from events that took place after the original complaint was filed 
and dismissed for lack of standing. This holding reinforced the split in the 
federal circuit courts; the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits require 
plaintiffs to establish standing at the time of original filing, or otherwise 
file a new complaint if they want to plead subsequent events.  
This Article discusses a relatively minute issue with seemingly circular 
logic: in Plaintiff’s worst-case scenario, Plaintiff merely has to refile a 
new complaint alleging the subsequent facts and events in a way that 
 
 161. Supra Section II.A. 
 162. Carl W. Tobias, Elevated Pleading in Environmental Litigation, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357, 
361-62 (1994). 
 163. Pollack v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 577 F.3d 737, 742 n.2 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 164. For example, in Scahill, plaintiffs sought relief from what they saw as onerous restrictions and 
penalties on their liquor license. Scahill v. District of Columbia, 909 F.3d 1177, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 165. Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1184 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d) advisory committee notes to 1963 
amendment). 
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establishes standing; the harm discussed here is limited. However, this is 
precisely the kind of “technical obstacle” that the Federal Rules are 
designed to alleviate.166 By adopting the permissive approach, federal 
courts are able to, in a small way, achieve the Rule’s purpose of efficient 
and just resolution of each dispute without taking a heavy-handed or 
otherwise “unfair approach.”167 Therefore, because of the significant 
practical benefits and minimal detriments to the important features of the 
standing doctrine, Rule 15(d) supplemental pleadings best allow federal 








 166. Id. 
 167. See Rutherlgen, supra note 152 at 3-4 (discussing the tradeoffs inherent in the Supreme Court’s 
“Twiqbal” heightened pleading requirement). There is no associated trade of values in resolving standing 
issues through Rule 15(d) where appropriate. 
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